The Shadow Power of Indonesia’s Military: From the New Order to the Present Era
The Shadow Power of Indonesia’s Military: From the New Order to the Present Era
Politics | Democracy | Power Networks
For decades, the Indonesian military has not only lived inside barracks. Its presence has extended into government offices, major economic projects, and local political arenas. From the New Order (Orde Baru) era to the present day, certain rogue elements within the military have operated beyond defense duties, engaging instead in power, money, and influence. Although the 1998 Reformasi formally dismantled the military’s political role, the networks built over decades did not simply disappear—they adapted.
This article analyzes how informal military networks, often described as a shadow state, were formed during the New Order, survived reform, and continue to influence politics and the economy today.
Dual Function Doctrine: The Foundation of Military Power
During the New Order, the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) operated under the Dual Function (Dwifungsi ABRI) doctrine. This policy granted the military a double mandate: defense and socio-political governance. Active officers occupied civilian positions across the state, from ministers and governors to members of parliament.
By the early 1980s, records cited by Tempo showed around 13,000 active ABRI personnel serving outside military roles, including:
12 cabinet ministers
21 governors
Dozens of senior bureaucrats
75 active officers in parliament
The military also dominated strategic institutions such as the judiciary, state-owned enterprises, and diplomatic missions.
Through an expanded territorial command structure—from regional commands down to village-level units—the military maintained surveillance and control across society. While promoted as “unity between the military and the people,” this structure gave the armed forces unmatched reach and influence.
Military Business and Economic Domination
Alongside political power, the military developed deep roots in the economy. Initially justified as self-financing due to limited state budgets, military business activities expanded rapidly during the New Order.
Key sectors included:
Forestry and logging concessions (HPH)
Mining and resource extraction
Security services for private companies
Military foundations and cooperatives became commercial arms, often partnering with private entrepreneurs. In many cases, the military contributed not capital, but political protection and coercive power, receiving profits or shares in return.
This system produced patron–client networks linking generals, businessmen, local officials, and village leaders. These networks functioned as a parallel power structure, largely immune from legal accountability.
A “State Within a State”
Human rights organizations documented how off-budget military funding weakened civilian control. Even when governments attempted to limit military budgets, autonomous revenue streams allowed the armed forces to remain financially independent.
This created what observers called a “state within a state”—an informal system of power operating alongside official institutions, sustained by collusion between military elites, bureaucrats, and business actors.
Reformasi 1998: Formal Change, Informal Continuity
The fall of Suharto in 1998 marked a turning point. The Dual Function doctrine was abolished, the military withdrew from parliament, and the police were separated from the armed forces. In theory, the military returned to professional defense duties.
In practice, however, many networks endured.
Retired generals entered politics, forming or joining political parties.
Military-owned businesses were rebranded under foundations and cooperatives.
Security services became a lucrative gray area involving ex-military and, in some cases, active personnel.
The 2004 Armed Forces Law required the military to exit business activities, but implementation was partial. Many enterprises continued operating under new legal identities.
Decentralization and Local Power Brokers
With the introduction of direct local elections (Pilkada) after 2005, retired military officers increasingly ran for governor and regent positions. Their reputation for discipline and authority appealed to voters seeking stability after the chaos of reform.
By 2018, at least 17 former military and police officers contested regional elections. This trend strengthened the alliance between local politics, business interests, and military networks.
In resource-rich regions—such as Papua, Kalimantan, Aceh, and Sulawesi—certain military-linked actors became key economic brokers, often connected to:
Illegal mining
Illegal logging
Plantation expansion
Smuggling and border trade
Recruitment Scandals and Corruption Risks
In recent years, one of the most damaging issues has been corruption in military recruitment. Numerous cases have exposed brokers offering guaranteed admission into the armed forces in exchange for large sums of money.
This practice undermines:
Meritocracy
Public trust
Institutional professionalism
Experts warn that recruits who enter through bribery are more likely to engage in corruption later, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of abuse.
The Anatomy of Shadow Networks
These informal power networks are not formal organizations, but flexible alliances built on shared interests. They typically involve:
Retired officers acting as patrons and political brokers
Active rogue personnel providing operational access
Business actors supplying capital
Local officials granting permits and legitimacy
Middlemen and fixers managing communication and transactions
The network shifts and adapts, crossing institutional boundaries while remaining largely hidden.
Not the Institution, but the Deviations
It is crucial to stress that these practices do not represent the Indonesian military as a whole. The vast majority of personnel serve professionally and uphold institutional values. Since 2004, the military has formally prohibited involvement in politics and business.
However, loopholes and weak oversight allow a small number of actors to exploit gray areas between power, money, and authority.
Conclusion: The Long Road to Civilian Supremacy
Indonesia’s democratic transition has significantly reduced the military’s formal political role. Yet dismantling decades-old shadow networks remains a long and difficult process.
True reform requires:
Strong civilian oversight
Transparent law enforcement
Consistent accountability across institutions
Only then can Indonesia fully break from the legacy of informal military power and strengthen democratic governance.
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